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Florence.Abstract
As illustrated by the recent terrorist attacks in the U.S., one must often take
preventive actions to ﬁght risks before having precise information on their
probability distribution. In this paper, we explain how to adapt cost-beneﬁt
analysis to this situation. In an uncertain environment, the occurrence or
the absence of loss allows the decision maker to update his belief about the
frequency of losses in the future. Using a Bayesian expected utility model,
we show that the uncertainty on the distribution of the loss raises the initial
level of prevention if and only if the ratio of absolute prudence to absolute
risk aversion is smaller than 2. In a numerical exercice, we show that the
eﬀect of this uncertainty may be large.
Keywords: learning, parameters uncertainty, predictability, precaution-
ary principle, risk management, phantom risk.1 Introduction
In traditional models of risk prevention,1 the economy is static and the dis-
tribution of potential damages is known with certainty. This modeling is
therefore not satisfactory to examine various relevant policy questions deal-
ing with risk prevention. Consider for example the recent ”mad cow crisis”.
One could reduce the potential damages to the health of the population by
investing in various prevention activities, as for example by eliminating the
use of animal-based feeds for cow, or even by excluding generations of cows
borne before 1996 from the human diets. In France, the cost of this latter
policy has been estimated to around 3 billions euros. The diﬃcult challenge
for economists is to determine how to use the standard cost-beneﬁt analysis
to determine the eﬃciency of the preventive policy when the distribution of
potential damages to health is unknown. It is interesting to observe that
economists have been particularly silent during the diﬀerent stages of the
crisis, leaving politicians facing the problem alone with agricultural lobbies,
medical experts, sociologists and philosophers.
In this paper, we examine the problem of the optimal risk management
of phantom risks, namely risks whose actual distribution is uncertain. It is
a paradox that in spite of the ever improving scientiﬁc knowledge, the list of
phantom risks is increasing over time. Here is a partial list of risks that have
been phantom risks in the past, or are still considered as phantom: cancer
from asbestos in the 50’s, cancer from smoking in the 60’s, contamination
of AIDS by blood transfuses in the early 80’s, environmental and health
damages due to genetic manipulations of maize, global warming generated by
the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, health risks faced by
individuals exposed to low nuclear radiations (or to electromagnetic ﬁelds, as
those emitted by cellular phones), long term side eﬀects of new drugs, eﬀects
due to the presence of various hazardous wastes, and the list of illustrations
could go on by the hundreds.
What is the eﬀect of the uncertainty aﬀecting the distribution of a risk
on the way we should perceive its prevention? The so-called precautionary
principle,2 which is now a legal rule in several European countries, states
1See Ehrlich and Becker (1972), Briys and Schlesinger (1990), Konrad and Skaperdas
(1993), Lee (1998) and Jullien, Salani´ e and Salani´ e (1999).
2For a detailled discussion of the precautionary principle, see Godard (1997) and Gollier
and Treich (2000).
1that ”where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientiﬁc certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-eﬀective
measures to prevent environmental degradation”( Principle 15 of the 1992
Rio Declaration). It is still an open question to determine what this state-
ment means for the cost-beneﬁt analysis. In particular, it does not explain
which distribution of the risk should be considered to measure costs and
beneﬁts when this distribution is uncertain.
In any static model, because expected utility is linear in the vector of
probability p of the various states of nature, expected utility maximizers
facing some uncertainty about p should do as if the distribution of the risk
would be certain and ﬁxed at the mean Ep. However, Ellsberg (1961) showed
that several agents do not behave in the face of ambiguous probabilities like
expected-utility maximizers. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) proposed a de-
cision criteria in which agents would be averse to ambiguity. Under this
criteria, agents compute their expected utility (EU) for the various possible
distributions, and they do as if the distribution generating the lowest EU
would hold with certainty. This min-max criteria raises several diﬃculties.3
We will therefore assume in this paper that the population maximizes ex-
pected utility.
A common feature of the above-mentioned examples of phantom risks
is that there is some uncertainty about the intensity of the risk, but this
uncertainty will be reduced over time. This resolution of the uncertainty is
expected to come either from the observation of actual damages by those
3First, it is hard to believe that people are as much pessimistic. In a world where
extreme potential distributions of risk can rarely be excluded, the use of such a criteria
leads to a dead end. In the case of the mad cow for example, we don’t see a majority of
consumers completely eliminating beef from their diet (see Gollier (2001b)), a strategy that
would be optimal under ambiguity aversion. Second, such a model cannot be applied in a
dynamic framework as long as we have no sensible rule to update ambiguous probabilities
in a way similar to the Bayes rule for unambiguous probabilities. We believe that the
dynamic aspect of risk management is an essential element of the problem. Third, on
a more empirical ground, Viscusi and Chesson (1999), using a sample of 266 business
owners facing risks from climate change, show evidence of both ambiguity-seeking behavior
and ambiguity-averse behavior. More precisely, people seem to exhibit fears eﬀect of
ambiguity for small probabilities of suﬀering a loss, and hope eﬀects for large probabilities.
Fox and Tversky (1995) also showed in a series of experimental studies that ambiguity
aversion, present in comparative contexts in which a person is confronted to both clear and
ambiguous prospects, seems to disappear in noncomparative contexts in which a person
evaluates only one of these prospects in isolation.
2exposed to the risk, or by scientiﬁc progresses. In most cases, it seems that
the ﬁrst source of information dominates the second. It is the observation of
recent extreme weather events that brings new knowledge about the risk of
global warming, more than the improvement of climate modelling by meteo-
rologists. It is the observation of the number of consumers hit by the human
form of the mad cow disease in the U.K. that is the ﬁrst source of informa-
tion allowing for an update of our beliefs, as it happened that no apparent
progress has been made about our understanding the biological mechanisms
underlying the disease. Thus, our paper focuses on the optimal prevention
of a recurrent risk whose distribution is updated from observing its past
realizations by using Bayes rule.
How does this form of learning aﬀect the initial risk-taking attitude of
risk-averse expected-utility maximizers? The occurrence of a large loss in
the ﬁrst period has two eﬀects. First, it reduces wealth and it raises the
marginal utility of this wealth. Second, it induces agents to revise the prob-
ability of the worse scenario. The intuition suggests that this shift in the
expected distribution of the risk should raise the marginal value of wealth.
If this is true, then learning raises the marginal value of wealth where it is
large, and reciprocally, it reduces the marginal value of wealth where it is
low. In consequence, the process of learning plays a role on the initial risk
attitude that is equivalent to an increase in risk aversion. In other words,
the uncertainty about the distribution of damages makes agents more averse
to the risk, i.e., they will invest more in prevention. This is compatible with
the precautionary principle.
However, this result relies on the assumption that a bad news, i.e. an
increase in the probability of the bad scenario, raises the marginal value of
wealth. This is not true in general, however. Intuitively, an increase in the
probability of damages has two eﬀects on the marginal value of wealth. First,
it makes agents poorer in expectation in the future. This wealth eﬀect raises
the marginal value of wealth. The intensity of this eﬀect is increasing with
the speed at which the marginal utility of consumption decreases with con-
sumption, namely, it is increasing in the degree of absolute risk aversion A.
But there is a second eﬀect that goes the opposite direction. The increase
in the probability of loss induces agents to reduce their exposure to the risk
in the future. That yields a negative precautionary eﬀect, in the sense that
the reduced future risk makes wealth accumulation less valuable for a pre-
cautionary saving motive. This negative eﬀect is increasing in the intensity
3of the precautionary saving motive which is proportional to absolute pru-
dence P, an index introduced by Kimball (1990) to measure the degree of
convexity of marginal utility. We are thus in a situation to understand that
an increase in the loss probability raises the marginal value of wealth only
if the wealth eﬀect is suﬃciently stronger than the negative precautionary
eﬀect. This is the case only if the ratio of absolute risk aversion to absolute
prudence is larger than a critical level which we show to be equal to 1/2.
If, on the contrary, this ratio is less than 1/2, the uncertainty surrounding
the distribution of the risk should induce the social planner to reduce the
prevention eﬀort targeted to this risk in comparison to risks that are better
known, contradicting the precautionary principle.
It is not a simple task to determine whether A/P is larger than 1/2 be-
cause there is no estimation of absolute prudence in the literature. Following
most researches in macroeconomic and ﬁnance, let us make the assumption
that relative risk aversion is constant. Under this assumption it is easy to
check that A/P ≥ 0.5 if and only if relative risk aversion is larger than
1. This is a widely accepted assumption. Therefore, our model provides
an argument in favor of the precautionary principle by claiming that more
prevention eﬀorts should be targeted to more uncertain risks.
This work is related to a reviving literature of learning in dynamic portfo-
lio management. Our model is an example of a decision problem in which the
future investment opportunity set is stochastic. Merton (1973) was the ﬁrst
to characterize rules for the optimal dynamic portfolio management. Detem-
ple (1986), Gennotte (1986), Brennan (1998) and Brennan and Xia (1999)4
examined the speciﬁc case where the opportunity set is stochastic due to the
initial parameter uncertainty of the dynamic stochastic process. They solved
various continuous-time inﬁnite-horizon portfolio problems by assuming that
relative risk aversion is constant. They showed that the sign of the eﬀect of
4McCardle and Winkler (1992) examined a similar problem applied to gambling. In a
casino, there is an urn of indistinguishable coins, half of which are ”good” and half ”bad”.
The good coins land heads with diﬀerent probabilities that are known a priori. A single
coin is picked at random from the urn that is used for n plays of the game. At each play of
the game, you choose howmuch you w ant to bet. What is the optimal dynamic strategy
in this game against nature? McCardle and Winkler (1992) raised this question to over
200 students and obtained that most people prefer not to bet at ﬁrst, in order to gather
information about the coin. This is fully compatible with our result under the assumption
that A/P ≥ 0.5.
4learning on the initial optimal portfolio depends upon whether relative risk
aversion is larger or smaller than unity. One of the achievements of our paper
is to provide an intuition to this result by relying on the relative strength of
the wealth eﬀect and of the precautionary eﬀect generated by a change in
the distribution of the underlying risk.
Section 2 is devoted to the presentation of a simple two-period model.
The link between learning and the marginal value of wealth is established
in section 3. In section 4, we show that the eﬀect of an increase in the loss
probability in the second period raises the marginal value of wealth in the
ﬁrst period if and only if A/P is larger than 0.5. Our main result for the
two-period prevention problem is established in section 5. We show that our
main result can be extending to more than two periods in section 6, whereas
section 7 provides a numerical illustration of the eﬀect of the uncertainty
surrounding the probability of loss.
2 The two-period model
We consider an economy with a representative agent leaving for two periods
t =0 ,1. At the beginning of period t, the agent earns a sure income wt.
Consumption takes place at the end of each period. The von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function u on consumption is assumed to be increasing,
concave and three time continuously diﬀerentiable. His lifetime utility is
u(c0)+βu(c1), where ct is the consumption at the end of period t and β is
the discount factor.
At each period t, the agent faces a risk ￿ xt of loss L with probability p.
We assume that ￿ x0 and ￿ x1 are i.i.d.. Whereas L is perfectly known, the
probability p is subject to some uncertainty. Let ￿ π0 be the random variable
representing the prior uncertainty about the probability of the loss. Let
p0 = E￿ π0 be the expected prior probability of the loss.
At the end of the ﬁrst period, the representative agent updates his beliefs
about the probability of the loss. Let ￿ πL and ￿ πN be the posterior distribution
of this probability respectively in the loss state and in the no loss state.
Using Bayes’ rule, it is straightforward to check that pL = E￿ πL is larger than
pN = E￿ πN : observing a loss in the ﬁrst period raises the probability of a
loss in the second period.
At the beginning of each period, the representative agent has to determine
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Figure 1: The timing of the decision process
how much to invest in a preventive activity. Each dollar invested in it reduces
the loss by k ≥ 1 dollars if it occurs. If k is smaller than the inverse of the
probability of loss, the investment in prevention is actuarially unfair, and
the myopic representative agent does not fully prevent the loss to occur, i.e.,
the investment is less than L/k. We hereafter assume that k is smaller than
the inverse of the largest possible ex post expected probability of loss, i.e.,
k ≤ 1/pL. This assumption implies that the nonnegativity constraint on the
investment on prevention is never binding. This assumption could be relaxed
at the cost of more technicalities. Our results are robust to this relaxation.
A crucial element of the model is the opportunity for the agent to save
some of his initial income for consumption in the second period. Let R =1+ r
be the gross interest rate in the economy. We assume that it is not aﬀected
by ﬁrst period state. The saving decision takes place after observing the ﬁrst
period state. The timing of the decision process is described in Figure 1.
We solve the problem of the decision maker by backward induction. We
start with the second period prevention problem, given saving s and the
ﬁrst-period state x. It is written as
max
α E [￿ πxu(w1 + Rs −α − (L − kα) )+( 1− ￿ πx)u(w1 + Rs − α)], (1)
6where α is the amount invested in prevention in the second period. Because of
the linearity of the objective function with respect to probabilities, program
(1) can be rewritten as
v(s,px) =max
α pxu(w1+Rs−α−(L−kα))+(1−px)u(w1+Rs−α). (2)
The decision maker just need to know the expected probability of loss to
solve his problem. The ambiguity about ￿ π does not matter, as is standard
under expected utility. This principle was also recognized in Gennotte (1996)
who stated that the agent solves his dynamic decision problem in two stages.
First, the agent updates his beliefs using Bayes’ rule. Second, there is a
choice stage in which the agent maximizes his expected utility by using the
estimated probabilities obtained in the ﬁrst stage. In general, the optimal
prevention α∗(s,px) depends upon the level of savings s and the expected
probability px.
One can use the maximal expected utility v(s,px) of the second period
consumption to solve the saving problem that arises at the end of the ﬁrst
period. Let z denote the cash-on-hand of the agent at the end of the ﬁrst
period, that is after incurring the ﬁrst period loss if any, but before ﬁrst
period consumption. The consumption-saving problem is written as follows:
V (z,px) = max
s
u(z −s)+βv(s,px). (3)
It can be veriﬁed that V is increasing and concave with respect to its ﬁrst
argument.
Finally, the agent solves the ﬁrst period prevention problem:
max
α
p0V (w0 − α − (L − kα),p L)+( 1− p0)V (w0 − α,pN). (4)
The optimal level of prevention in the ﬁrst period is denoted α∗
0.We again
used the linearity of the objective function with respect to probabilities to
replace the uncertainty on ￿ π0 by its expectation p0. The diﬃculty of this
decision problem comes from the state dependency of the indirect utility
function V . However, because the objective function is a weighted sum of
concave functions of the decision variable, the ﬁrst-order condition is neces-
sary and suﬃcient for an optimum.
Our objective in this paper is to compare α∗
0 to the optimal level of initial
prevention when the probability of loss is known with certainty and is equal
7to p0. Notice that there is no learning in this alternative model. The decision
problem of the representative agent is written as
max
α p0V (w0 − α − (L − kα),p 0)+( 1− p0)V (w0 − α,p0). (5)
We want to determine the condition under which the optimal solution ￿ α0 of
this program is smaller than α∗
0, the optimal level of prevention when the
probability of loss is uncertain, but with the same prior expected loss.
3 The eﬀect of the state dependent utility on
the optimal prevention
The ﬁrst-order condition for the ﬁrst period level of prevention when there








where zL = w0 − ￿ α0 −(L−k￿ α0) is the cash-on-hand when a loss occurs, and
zN = w0 − ￿ α0 is the cash-on-hand when there is no accident. Because the
objective function of program (4) is concave in the decision variable α, its
optimal solution will be larger than ￿ α0 if and only if its derivative with respect
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This condition would be satisﬁed if an increase in the probability of loss would
raise the marginal value of cash-on-hand. Indeed, this would imply that the
left-hand side of the above equality would be larger than unity, whereas the
right-hand side would be smaller than unity. We thus proved the following
Lemma.
8Lemma 1 The uncertainty about the probability of loss increases (resp. re-
duces) the optimal initial level of prevention if the marginal value of wealth
(∂V/∂z) is an increasing (resp. decreasing) function of the probability of loss.
This result is intuitive. Suppose that the marginal value of wealth is
increasing in the probability of loss. The occurrence of a loss in the ﬁrst
period raises the probability of loss in the second period. This raises the
marginal value of wealth in a state where it is already large because of the
loss itself. On the contrary, the absence of a loss in the ﬁrst period reduces
the probability of a loss in the second period. It also reduces the marginal
value of wealth in a state where it is already relatively small because the
agent is wealthy. In comparison to the case where the probability of a loss is
certain, the learning process reduces the marginal value of wealth where it is
low and it increases it where it is large. These eﬀects are thus equivalent to
an increase in the concavity of the value function with respect to wealth. In
conclusion, this raises the optimal investment in prevention.
4 The eﬀect of an increase in the probability
of loss on the marginal value of wealth
We must thus examine the conditions under which an increase in the prob-
ability of loss raises the marginal value of wealth. We do this in two steps.
First, we consider the pure static prevention problem (2). We derive the con-
dition for ∂v(s,p)/∂s to be increasing in p. We then extend the analysis to
take into account of the saving problem ( 3), by showing that this property
is inherited by function V .
The following second Lemma relies on two indexes: the index of absolute
risk aversion A(c)=−u￿￿(c)/u￿(c) which measures the concavity of u, and the
index of absolute prudence P(c)=−u￿￿￿(c)/u￿￿(c), which measures the degree
of convexity of marginal utility. This latter concept has been introduced by
Kimball (1990) to measure the strength of the precautionary saving motive
in a lifecycle consumption model.
Lemma 2 An increase in the expected probability of loss raises (resp. re-
duces) the marginal value of savings ∂v/∂s deﬁned by program (2) if and
only if the ratio of absolute prudence to absolute risk aversion is smaller
(resp. larger) than 2.
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Because we assumed that k ≤ 1/p, the ﬁrst-order condition (9) implies that
u￿
L ≥ u￿
N. This means that L − kα∗ is positive, namely, that the loss is not
fully covered. It implies that consumption is larger in the no loss state than
in the loss state. This implies that condition (11) is satisﬁed if and only
if the function φ deﬁned by φ(c)=u￿￿(c)/(u￿(c))2 is decreasing in c. This
is equivalent to requiring that u￿￿￿(c)(u￿(c))2 − 2u￿(c)(u￿￿(c))2 be nonpositive.
This is the case if and only if P/A is uniformly smaller 2.￿
Thus, when P/A is smaller than 2, an increase in the probability of loss
raises the marginal value of savings. Of course, it also increases the optimal
level of savings and the marginal value of cash-on-hand in the ﬁrst period,
as stated in the following Lemma.
10Lemma 3 An increase in the expected probability of loss raises (resp. re-
duces) the marginal value of cash-on-hand ∂V/∂z deﬁned by program (3) and
savings if and only if the ratio of absolute prudence to absolute risk aversion
is smaller (resp. larger) than 2.




























Because v is concave in s, we directly obtain that ∂s∗/∂p and ∂2V/∂z∂p have
the same sign than ∂2v/∂s∂p. Lemma 2 yields the result.￿
There is an intuition for this result. Consider the special case p =1 /k
as our benchmark. In such a situation, the investment in prevention is ac-
tuarially fair, and it is optimal to fully prevent the risk. Suppose now that
the probability of loss is reduced, thereby making the investment in preven-
tion actuarially unfair. This reduction in the probability of loss increases
the expected ﬁnal consumption. Because the agent wants to smooth his con-
sumption over time, this reduction in the probability reduces his willingness
to save. The strength of this consumption smoothing eﬀect is proportional to
the index A of aversion to consumption ﬂuctuation over time. But because
the return on the preventive investment is actuarially unfair, it is optimal
not to eliminate the risk completely. The presence of this future risk induces
the representative agent to accumulate precautionary saving. The strength
of this precautionary eﬀect is proportional to P, as shown by Kimball (1990).
Thus, a reduction in the probability of loss reduces savings if and only if the
precautionary eﬀect is dominated the consumption smoothing eﬀect. This
is the case when P/A is suﬃciently small. From the above Lemma, this is
in fact the case when P/A is smaller than 2. If the level of savings is re-
duced, the ﬁrst period consumption is increased, and the marginal utility of
11consumption, together with the marginal value of cash-on-hand, is reduced.
Thus, when P/Ais smaller than 2, the optimal saving and the marginal value
of cash-on-hand are positively correlated with the probability of loss.
Notice that the above results do not hold only for the case of a departure
of p from the fair situation p =1 /k. They also hold for any marginal changes
in the probability of loss. A marginal reduction in the probability of loss raises
the expected ﬁnal consumption, and it also raises the size of the optimal risk
taken by the decision maker. The same consumption smoothing eﬀect and
the same precautionary eﬀect work at the margin.
5 The main result and its discussion
We can combine our three lemmas to derive the following result, which is our
main result.
Proposition 1 The uncertainty about the probability of loss raises (resp.
reduces) the eﬃcient level of the preventive eﬀort in the ﬁrst period if the
ratio of absolute prudence to absolute risk aversion is smaller (resp. larger)
than unity.
To sum up, when P/Ais smaller than 2, the consumption smoothing eﬀect
dominates the precautionary eﬀect. In such a situation, learning reduces the
marginal value of wealth in the no loss state, and it raises the marginal value
of wealth in the loss state. This induces the representative agent to raise
the investment in the preventive activity. Notice that, as is well-known, log
utility decision maker are optimally myopic. In this speciﬁc environment, this
means that their optimal investment in prevention in the ﬁrst period is not
aﬀected by the uncertainty surrounding the probability of loss.
Condition P/A ≤ 2 is not new in the economics of uncertainty. De-
termining whether P/A is smaller than 2 or equivalently whether 1/u￿(c)
is convex in c appeared in diﬀerent contexts. Dr` eze and Modigliani (1972)
examined the reduction in the level of savings due to the introduction of com-
plete insurance markets. They proved that the level of savings decreases in
such a circumstance if and only if d2(U1/U2)/dc2
2 ≥ 0 where Uj denotes par-
tial derivatives of a non time-separable utility function U(c1,c 2). Assuming
U(c1,c 2)=u(c1)+v(c2) this condition becomes 1/v￿ convex.
12Condition P/A ≤ 2 is also useful in industrial economics. For example,
Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagn´ e (1997)uses it in a problem of optimal audit in
the principal-agent model. Finally, Debreu and Koopmans (1982)argue that
a good measure of risk aversion should be the ”concavity index” −u￿￿/(u￿)2.I f
we admit the Debreu and Koopmans index, decreasing absolute risk aversion
is thus equivalent to P/A ≥ 2. The Debreu-Koopmans index was recently
used in political economy theory. For example, Alesina and Tabellini (1990)
showed that the uncertainty in the identity of the median tomorrow generates
a bias towards deﬁcit if the concavity index is decreasing.
The more general condition P/A ≥ m is useful for various values of scalar
m. For example, the case m = 0 corresponds to positive prudence, a condi-
tion that is standard since Leland (1968)to justify the precautionary motive
to saving. The stronger condition corresponding to m = 1 is equivalent to
decreasing absolute risk aversion. This condition is also very natural. How-
ever, decreasing absolute risk aversion (P/A ≥ 1)may be compatible either
with P/A ≤ 2o r w i t hP/A ≤ 2. In particular, the condition P/A ≤ 2
that is compatible with the precautionary principle means that absolute risk
aversion can be decreasing, but not too much decreasing.
Because there does not exist any reliable estimation of the degree of ab-
solute prudence, determining whether P/A is smaller or larger than 2 is thus
an open question. Some light can be shed on this question by limiting the
analysis to utility functions exhibiting constant relative risk aversion, namely
those with u￿(c)=c−γ. In that case, relative risk aversion is constant and
equal to γ. Moreover, P/A =( γ +1 ) /γ. Therefore, when relative risk aver-
sion is constant, P/A is smaller than 2 if and onlyif relative risk aversion is
larger than unity. There exist compelling evidence that most people have a
relative risk aversion larger than unity. For example, as is well-known from
the so-called equitypremium puzzle, it is hard to explain the observed asset
prices over the centurywithout rely ing to preferences exhibiting a degree
of relative risk aversion smaller than 30. Gollier (2000a) presents a similar
puzzle on the insurance demand: the standard insurance model cannot ex-
plain the verylow l evel of deductible in insurance without making a similar
assumption. An experienced reader in macroeconomics and in ﬁnance would
observe that most researchers calibrate their model byusing an index of rel-
ative risk aversion between 1 and 10. We conclude that there is a consensus
on this interval in our profession, and that P/A should be smaller than 2,
assuming that relative risk aversion be constant. According to Proposition
131, we should observe that agents invest more in prevention for risks whose
probabilityof loss is more uncertain, ceteris paribus.
In this paper, we assume that the onlysource of information comes from
observing the realization of the risk in the ﬁrst period. As in Gollier, Jullien
and Treich (2000), we could have considered the possibilityto update our
beliefs byobserving other signals, as those coming from the impr ovement of
scientiﬁc knowledge. However, it can be inferred from Gollier (2000b) that
this form of learning has no eﬀect on the optimal risk exposure in the ﬁrst
period when relative risk aversion is constant.
6 Extension to more than 2 periods
In this section, we show that our two-period model can be extended to any
ﬁnite horizon T model without aﬀecting our result.
Let Jt(s, ￿ π) be the value of wealth at the beginning of period t.I ti sa
function of wealth s available at that date, and of the current distribution ￿ π
of the probability of loss. We have JT+1(s,￿ π)=u(wT + Rs). Within period
t, two diﬀerent decisions are taken. At the end of the period, there is a
consumption-saving decision which is written as
Vt(z,￿ πt+1)=ma x
s u(z −s)+βJt+1(s,￿ πt+1)( 1 2 )
for a given cash-on-hand z available after the realization of risk ￿ xt during the
period and the corresponding updated distribution ￿ πt+1 of the loss probabil-
ity. Ex-ante, before the realization of ￿ xt, the representative agent determines
the optimal level of prevention by solving the following problem:
Jt−1(s,￿ πt)=m a x
α
[E￿ πt]Vt(wt +Rs−α−(L −kα),￿ πt+1 | ￿ πt,￿ xt = L)( 1 3 )
+(1 − [E￿ πt])Vt(wt + Rs − α,￿ πt+1 | ￿ πt,￿ xt =0 ) .
We would be done if the condition P/A ≥ 2o rP/A ≤ 2 would be trans-
mitted from Jt+1 to Vt, and from Vt to Jt−1. We hereafter show that these
inheritance properties hold. By using backward induction and Proposition
1, we will conclude that the initial level of prevention would be increased by
the uncertainty surrounding the probability of loss.
14Observe ﬁrst that both the consumption-saving problem (12) and the
prevention problem (13) can be written can be written as
h(w) = max
c(.)
Eg(c(￿ s),￿ s)( 1 4 )
s.t. Eη(￿ s)c(￿ s)=w, (15)
for some random variable ￿ s, some function g(.,.) that is concave with re-
spect to its ﬁrst argument and some positive function η(.). For exam-
ple,the consumption-saving problem corresponds to a binary distribution
of ￿ s ∼ (1,1/(1 + β);2,β/(1 + β)),g (c,1) = u(c),g (c,2) = Jt+1(c,￿ πt+1),
η(1) = β +1 ,η( 2 )=( β +1 ) /β and z = w. A similar exercise can be done
for program (13). Thus the question is to determine whether function h in











This property is proved in the next Proposition, whose technical proof is rel-
egated to the Appendix. This result is extracted from Gollier (2001, Propo-
sition 53, chapter 14).
Proposition 2 Consider problem (14),(15) with a positive function η and a
function g(.,.) that is three time continuously diﬀerentiable and concave with
respect to its ﬁrst argument. Consider also any scalar m. Ph/Ah is uniformly
smaller (resp. larger) than m whenever Pg/Ag is uniformly smaller (resp.
larger) than m. It implies that the result presented in Proposition 1 holds
when the time horizon has more than 2 periods.
This result is related to the one by Caroll and Kimball (1996) who have
shown that condition P/A ≥ m is a property that value functions inherits
from the utility function in the standard consumption-saving problem, and
for the standard portfolio problem. It is important to stress that the opposite
property P/A ≤ m does not hold in general for the portfolio problem, when
markets are incomplete. Our result states that this property is also inherited
by the value function from the utility function when markets are complete,
which is implicitly the case in our model with two states and two investment
opportunities.
157 A numerical example with inﬁnite horizon
It is not easy to describe the state contingent optimal prevention strategy
in a ﬁnite horizon model, because this strategy depends upon the number of
periods remaining. In this section, we estimate the eﬀect of the uncertainty
surrounding the probability of loss by assuming that the representative agent
has an inﬁnite horizon. The assumption that the time horizon is inﬁnite is
for the sake of simplicity, as it makes the optimal strategy independent of
time. Our computations show that agents with a ﬁnite horizon follow almost
the same strategy than if the horizon would be inﬁnite if they have more
than, say, 20 periods remaining. This is a standard ”turnpike” property of
dynamic strategies.
In an inﬁnite horizon model, it is easier to consider a timing of the intra-
period t by looking at the joint saving st and prevention αt+1 decisions that
take place after the realization of risk ￿ xt. We therefore take the cash-on-hand
z at that time as the state variable. This has the advantage to make the
consumption in period t dependent of the risk in t only through the state
variable zt.
We assume that the agent has a constant income w per period. We
suppose that the probability p of loss can be either p1 or p2 ≤ p1. This
implies that the beliefs in period t is completely characterized by πt, the
probability that p be equal to p1. Using Bayes’ rule, this probability will be
increased to
πt+1(πt,￿ xt = L)=
πtp1
πtp1 +( 1−πt)p2
in period t+1 if a loss is incurred in period t. On the contrary, it is reduced
to
πt+1(πt,￿ xt =0 )=
πt(1 − p1)
πt(1 − p1)+( 1− πt)(1 − p2)
if no loss was observed in period t.L e tz represent the cash-on-hand before




+β(πp1 +( 1− π)p2)J(w + Rs − α − (L − kα),π t+1(π,L))
+β(1 − πp1 − (1 − π)p2)J(w + Rs − α,πt+1(π,0))
16where J is the value function depending upon the two state variables z and
π. After some manipulations, we can rewrite the Bellman equation as
J(z,π)=m a x
C,A
u(C)+βE[J(w + R(z − C)+Ag(￿ x),π t+1(π,￿ x)) | π],
where C is the level of consumption, A is the non-prevented loss L − kα,
w = w − k−1L is the per-period income net of the cost of eliminating the
risk, and g(L)=k−1 − 1 and g(0) = k−1.
We hereafter assume that the representative agent has a constant relative










The level of consumption and the non-prevented loss are proportional to the
level of wealth measured by the sum of cash-on-hand and the present value
of the next net income. We hereafter focus on the policy functions where
(z +( w/R)) has been normalized to unity.






















for all π ∈ [0,1].
There is no hope to solve this system analytically, except in the loga-
rithmic case (γ = 1). In the following, we present two simulations in which
relative risk aversion is set to 2, the rate of pure preference for the present is
equal to 2% (β =0 .98) and the interest rate is ﬁxed to 1% (R =1 .01). More-
over, we assume that k = 2 : each dollar invested in prevention reduces the
17loss by 2 dollars. In Figure 2, we draw an heavy curve describing the optimal
level of non-prevented loss when the probability of loss is either p1 =1 0 %
with probability π,o rp2 = 1% with probability 1−π. We compare this policy
to the one (thin curve) that would be optimal without any uncertainty on the
probability of loss that would be set to p = πp1+(1−π)p2. In accordance to
our main result, the parameter uncertainty reduces the optimal level of the
non-prevented loss, i.e., it raises the initial prevention eﬀort. Consider for
example a situation in which there is no uncertainty about the probability
of loss, which would be set equal to p =0 .055. Compare this situation with
the one in which the probability of loss is distributed as (0.1,0.5;0.01,0.5).
Notice that the expected probability of loss is p =0 .055 in the two situations.
In Figure 2, we see that the optimal size of the non-prevented loss is reduced
by 7%, coming from 104% to 97% of current wealth.
Of course the eﬀect of parameter uncertainty is increasing with the size of
the uncertainty. In Figure 3, we draw the optimal policy when the probability
of loss is either p1 =0 .5 with probability π or p2 =0 .01 with probability
1−π. Suppose that π =0 .5. In such an uncertain environment, the optimal
value of a equals 0.045. On the contrary, when there is no uncertainty about
the probability of loss ﬁxed at p =0 .255, the optimal a is equal to 0.504.
This means that the uncertainty on p reduces the optimal retained loss by
more than 90%. In fact, the optimal level of prevention with a =0 .045 would
be optimal in the absence of parameter uncertainty only if the probability of
loss would be ﬁxed at p =0 .48. In other words, the parameter uncertainty
should induce the representative agent to do as if the probability of loss would
be set to p =0 .48, very close to the worst case scenario with p1 =0 .5! This
eﬀect is increasing with the degree of risk aversion.
8 Conclusion
People should devote more preventive eﬀort, not less eﬀort, when the risk is
more uncertain. The uncertainty surrounding the intensity of a risk should
not be taken as an excuse to delay investing in prevention. We show that
this intuitive guideline is indeed optimal for expected-utility maximizers as
soon as the ratio of their absolute prudence to their absolute risk aversion is
uniformly smaller than 2, as is the case when their relative risk aversion is
constant and larger than unity. Because this latter assumption is sustained by










Figure 2: Optimal level of non-prevented loss when the probability of loss is
distributed as (0.1,π;0.01,1 − π) (thick curve).









Figure 3: Optimal level of non-prevented loss when the probability of loss is
distributed as (0.5,π;0.01,1 − π) (thick curve).
20the data, this paper provides a strong argument in favor of the precautionary
principle.
Our model has its own limitations that should call for extensions. For
example, we assumed that the size of the risk taken in the ﬁrst period does
not aﬀect the quality of the signal. In reality, it is possible that the quality
of the signal be increasing in the accepted size of the risk exposure. It could
be interesting to examine the eﬀect of this experimentation problem on the
initial risk-taking attitude. A second potential extension would come from
relaxing our assumption that the signal is immediately observed. In some
cases, as for the mad cow disease or global warming, signals are observed a
long time after risks have been undertaken. How do these delays aﬀect the
optimal dynamic risk management? Finally, we assumed in this paper that
past decisions do not aﬀect the current level of the risk. In many instances,
there is a phenomenon of accumulation that takes place: the larger the risk
accepted in the past, the larger the risk exposure today. For example, the risk
of global warming in 100 years of now will depend upon the accumulation
of greenhouse gas emissions. Gollier, Jullien and Treich (2000) examined a
similar question, but without allowing for endogenous learning.
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24Appendix: Proof of Proposition 2
Let Tf(w)=−f￿(w)/f￿￿(w) denote the degree of absolute risk tolerance
of function f, with f being function h(.)o rg(.,s). In the latter case, the








Therefore Pf/Af is larger (smaller) than m if T￿
f is larger (smaller) than
m−1. Let c(.)=ψ(.,w) characterize the solution of program (14),(15). The
ﬁrst-order condition for this program is written as
g
￿(ψ(s,w),s)=ξ(w)η(s)
for all s, where ξ(z) is the Lagrangian multiplier associated to constraint

























= Eη(￿ s)Tg(ψ(￿ s,w),￿ s).
But by the envelope theorem, h￿(w)=ξ(w) and, thus, Th(w)=−ξ(w)/ξ￿(w).
We conclude that










25Because of the ﬁrst inequality in (16), we see that the above equality means
that T￿
h is a weighted average of T ￿
g(ψ,s).
Suppose that Pg/Ag is uniformly smaller than m, then T￿
g is uniformly
smaller than m − 1. Because T ￿
h is a weighted average of T￿
g(ψ(.,w),.), T￿
h
must be uniformly smaller than m−1, which in turn means that Ph/Ah must
be smaller than m. ￿
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